The Turn of the Offended: Clientelism in the Wake of El Salvador’s 2009 Elections by Montoya, Ainhoa
	  	  
1	  	  
Pre-copyedited version. Final version published in Montoya, Ainhoa. 2015. ‘The Turn of the Offended: 
Clientelism in the Wake of El Salvador’s 2009 Elections.’ Social Analysis 59(4): 101–118. 
  
The Turn of the Offended: 





Drawing on fieldwork in a Salvadoran municipio during and after the 2009 presidential 
elections, this article explores how the affective dynamics involved in elections and routine 
politics might inform us about the conditions of possibility for specific political imaginaries. 
Passions ran high among ordinary Salvadorans on both the left and right, as allusions to 
wartime unsettled political divisions and offences. For many disaffected Salvadorans, the 
victory of the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front—a former guerrilla organization—
opened up a political horizon previously foreclosed during the post-war era. I show how 
ordinary Salvadorans’ post-election engagement with state officials and FMLN party leaders 
through clientelist practices evidenced their desire for qualitative state transformation, as well 
as the extent to which they conceive of themselves as citizens through the state. 
 









…Ahora es la hora de mi turno 
El turno del ofendido por años silencioso 
A pesar de los gritos… 
[Now it’s my turn 
The turn of the offended after years of silence 
In spite of the screams] 
 
Roque Dalton, “El turno del ofendido” (1962) 
 
On the evening of 15 March 2009, former journalist and Salvadoran presidential candidate 
Mauricio Funes announced publicly the results of El Salvador’s fourth democratic 
presidential elections: the party he represented, the Farabundo Martí National Liberation 
Front (FMLN), had won. The FMLN originated as a Marxist-Leninist guerrilla organization 
in 1980 and became a legalized party at the end of the twelve-year civil war between the 
FMLN and the Salvadoran state that ravaged El Salvador during the 1980s. The FMLN’s 
victory had no precedent in a country ruled by military dictatorships and elite governments 
throughout the twentieth century. Since 1989, the right-wing, anti-communist and pro-elite 
Nationalist Republican Alliance (ARENA) had governed El Salvador, with the FMLN being 
the primary opposition force beginning with the 1994 elections. For many, the 2009 FMLN 
victory represented a potential watershed in the country’s economic and political situation. 
Although far from a landslide, the FMLN’s victory sparked exhilaration among the many 
Salvadorans advocating political change. In San Salvador, El Salvador’s capital, waves of 
people dressed in FMLN’s red and waving red flags with the party’s logo flooded the central 
streets until late at night. Jubilant after the victory, a vast array of FMLN supporters—young, 
old, mothers and fathers with children in their arms—screamed, laughed and chanted in 
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unison, “El pueblo unido jamás sera vencido” [The people united will never be defeated]. 
Some people turned on their car radios, from which blared FMLN’s election theme songs, 
featuring refrains such as “Nace la esperanza, viene el cambio” [Hope is being born, change is 
coming]. 
The optimism pervading the massive celebrations in San Salvador’s streets echoed the 
sentiment said to have characterized the celebrations that occurred in 1992 at the end of the 
civil war (Murray 1997: 2–3). On 16 January 1992, two hundred thousand Salvadorans 
gathered at San Salvador’s central plaza Gerardo Barrios, singing the insurgent Sombrero 
Azul to celebrate the signing of Peace Accords by representatives of the Salvadoran 
government and FMLN commanders in Chapultepec, Mexico. Large red flags and FMLN 
banners, hitherto outlawed, had been laid over the façade of the National Palace and the 
Metropolitan Cathedral, two of the main buildings surrounding the plaza. The Peace Accords 
signified for many the positive outcome of a civil war that had otherwise devastated the 
country economically and killed or disappeared more than 75,000 Salvadorans. 
Although the signing of the Chapultepec Accords stirred great expectations among 
Salvadorans, during the negotiations preceding the accords the FMLN relinquished its 
commitment to economic reform in order to concentrate on political and institutional changes, 
thereby allowing successive ARENA governments to continue their implementation of an 
intense neoliberal agenda that was to transform El Salvador from a monoculture export 
economy into one based on finance, exacerbating the country’s longstanding problem of rural 
poverty (Segovia 2002: 178–182). Meanwhile, during the post-war era homicide rates have 
escalated relative to the last stages of the war (Cruz 1998b: 6; Ramos 2000: 9). Disaffection 
and disillusionment among ordinary Salvadorans have steadily intensified during the two 
decades since the war’s end as everyday economic and public insecurities became ever more 
acute (Cruz 1998a, 2001; Moodie 2010: 145; Silber 2011). 
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I juxtapose these two celebratory moments in the history of El Salvador to raise 
questions about how hopes stemming from specific political imaginaries are born, maintained 
and exhausted. Specifically, drawing on my research in the predominantly rural area of 
Santiago Nonualco, the second largest municipio in El Salvador’s La Paz region, I seek to 
elucidate how Salvadorans conceive of and relate to the state after their country’s ‘transition’ 
to democracy. Despite the generalized disaffection and distrust among ordinary Salvadorans 
vis-à-vis state officials and institutions in the late 2000s, a large portion of El Salvador’s 
population participated actively and passionately in the 2009 elections. In the region where I 
did my research, many left-wing and disaffected Salvadorans who had placed their hopes in 
the FMLN regarded this party’s victory as an opportunity for redress and began engaging the 
state through clientelist networks following the election. The ways in which ordinary people 
engaged political networks, I argue, evidence the degree to which Salvadorans conceive of the 
state as a legitimate interlocutor—disillusionment and disaffection with democracy 
notwithstanding. In other words, there has been a genuine aspiration to the state that runs 
parallel to their disaffection vis-à-vis the actually existing state. 
 
A Sense of Possibility 
In order to examine popular participation in party politics during El Salvador’s elections and 
their aftermath and to understand the relevance of this participation to state-citizenry relations 
in a country that has undergone a ‘transition’ to democracy, I invoke Verdery’s (1999: 23–27) 
appeal to animate or enchant the study of politics. Verdery (1999: 26) has suggested that we 
animate the study of politics by “energizing it with something more than the opinion polls, 
surveys, analyses of ‘democratization indices,’ and game-theoretic formulations that dominate 
so much of the field of comparative politics.” Accordingly, even as I focus in this article on 
formal political arenas, elections and routine party politics, I do so by concentrating first on 
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the passion that pervaded the 2009 elections and then on the sentiment of aggrievement that 
surfaced soon after. 
Elections and clientelism are two arenas of party politics that appear intimately related 
in El Salvador as well as in many other Latin American countries (see Auyero 2000; Gay 
1999; Lazar 2004; McDonald 1997). Electoral processes in El Salvador have involved the 
mobilization of material resources and favors—especially by ARENA, the governing party 
until 2009—so as to maintain more or less permanent political clienteles. Clientelism in El 
Salvador is part of routine politics since this mobilization of resources and exchange of favors 
does not begin or end with electoral campaigns. In this article I am particularly interested in 
the frenzied activation of these networks through the FMLN party and the new FMLN-led 
government in the aftermath of the 2009 elections. After Election Day, many ordinary 
Salvadorans in Santiago enthusiastically approached party leaders and state officials with 
various requests and demands. While this may not seem unusual, as I will show later, these 
Salvadorans relied on clientelism, interestingly, out of a generalized sentiment of having been 
wronged, historically as well as recently, and with the goal of seeking redress for various 
kinds of exclusions. 
The 2009 presidential elections brought to the fore the relevance of ritualized elements 
and affective dynamics. As underscored by recent ethnographic research on the procedural 
elements and party politics of other democratic polities (see Banerjee 2007; Coles 2004; 
Lazar 2004; McDonald 1997; McLeod 1999), these rituals and affective dynamics—
overlooked in previous analyses of elections—shed light on the processes by which voters 
calculate their stakes in elections. Abstention, which had predominated in El Salvador’s 
elections until 2004,i has typically been explained as a symptom of cynicism and 
disillusionment (Cruz 1998a, 2001). However, from 2004, ARENA’s active mobilization of 
war-related polarized discourse and symbols ignited latent conflicts and passions among 
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many Salvadorans (Montoya 2013). This exacerbation of ongoing conflicts is rooted in El 
Salvador’s civil war—a domestic episode that evolved into a Cold War battle and was 
eventually brought to an end with United Nations-brokered peace negotiations, and which 
nonetheless remains a source of deep social and political division. 
I suggest that the unprecedented degree to which the Salvadoran population actively 
participated in the 2009 elections can be attributed to a complex intersection of passionate 
feeling and an emerging sense of possibility for political change. In her research on the 
emergence, development and demise of an AIDS activist group in the United States, Gould 
(2009: 3) suggests that affect, emotions and feelings can inform us about “political 
imaginaries and their conditions of possibility”. She regards affect, emotions and feelings as a 
source of knowledge about what moves people toward political action or inaction. Building 
on Massumi, Gould (2009: 23–26, 31) contends that affect denotes the visceral yet 
presupposes sociality; affect allows for an exploration of ambivalence and contradiction that a 
focus solely on emotions and feelings as qualified and structured states eclipses. Yet, in 
contrast to Gould (2009: 32), I do not invoke here the concept of affect as a relatively 
autonomous force but rather as a felt intensity or charge suffusing a particular milieu or 
environment. This understanding of affect is akin to that advanced in works that have 
underscored the relationship between subjects and their environments (see Navaro-Yashin 
2012: 17–27; Richard and Rudnyckyj 2009: 73). This article thus contributes to the study of 
an affective milieu and its relationship to an emerging sense among Salvadorans that specific 
political imaginaries might actually come about. In other words, I explore how the passions 
on display in El Salvador’s 2009 elections were related to a renewed sense of possibility—
that is, to the opening of a new political horizon—for how Salvadorans imagined their 
relationship to the state. 
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In examining the relationship between democracy and the collective sentiment of hope, 
Appadurai (2007) contends that democracy must be built on hope in order to achieve a mass 
politics and distance itself from tyranny. Within a democratic context, Appadurai suggests 
that we view hope as emerging from the space between utopia on the one hand and 
pragmatism and policy on the other. Building upon this delineation that considers hope “about 
possibilities rather than about probabilities” (ibid.: 30), I suggest that deep post-war 
disillusionment in El Salvador had gradually eclipsed the intermediate realm of hope. A sense 
of possibility, however, re-emerged—albeit only temporarily—during the 2009 elections. The 
emotionally saturated nature of the elections and of clientelist engagements with FMLN’s 
state officials and party leaders evidenced an aspiration to a state that would provide a redress 
of wartime and post-war offences and exclusions. 
I argue that a focus on both the passion and the deep-rooted sense of indignation and 
aggrievement among those involved in routine politics in El Salvador can serve as a lens 
through which to understand Salvadorans’ participation in clientelist networks after the 2009 
elections. Specifically, I seek to elucidate how this sudden embrace of clientelism is related to 
the opening up of a political horizon enabled by the affective milieu of the elections. In the 
two sections that follow, I depict the affective milieu of the 2009 presidential election and its 
aftermath and suggest why it can be analytically fruitful to bring this to the fore. In the 
remainder of the article I suggest that the surge in political clientelism through the FMLN that 
occurred in the aftermath of the 2009 elections might evidence a deep-seated desire for 
engagement with the state, and I trace the historical origins of such desire. 
 
The 2009 Elections 
On the eve of a visit by ARENA presidential candidate Rodrigo Ávila to Santiago Nonualco 
on 19 September 2008, I saw a large group of young men sporting t-shirts with ARENA’s 
	  	  
8	  	  
logo heading out towards the rural areas that surround the municipio. Through a window at 
my host family’s house, I watched as they painted all the lampposts on the central Avenida 
Anastasio Aquino with the blue-white-red evoking ARENA’s tri-color flag and plastered 
walls and house fronts with posters of their candidate. This occurred despite the obvious 
disgruntlement of residents in Barrio El Ángel, who are overwhelmingly FMLN loyalists. 
About half an hour later, a couple of my neighbors arrived at the house to swap impressions 
on an incident that had just occurred nearby. An ARENA member had ripped a poster of 
FMLN candidate Mauricio Funes off a house front and replaced it with one of Rodrigo Ávila. 
Irritated, the owner of the house had come out to complain and had begun shouting at the 
ARENA members until one of them threatened him at gunpoint. My neighbors speculated 
that the armed men accompanying the ARENA contingent had been paid directly by the 
regional ARENA deputy, a local from Santiago whom rumors connected to various violent 
episodes, especially during elections. 
Later that evening, a few neighbors, likewise resentful about the new colors imposed 
on their street and house fronts, assured that the ARENA propaganda would not last long. By 
6am the next day, the lampposts, the kerb of the sidewalk, walls, even rocks and tree trunks 
on the Anastasio Aquino Avenue were covered with red paint symbolizing the FMLN. 
Posters of Mauricio Funes and FMLN flags had reappeared. I asked a neighbor about the 
chameleonic transformation of the street that had occurred overnight. He explained that 
ARENA members had been guarding their work until midnight. FMLN loyalists had waited 
until they left and then proceeded to paint over ARENA’s work, burn the ARENA flags, and 
plaster posters of Mauricio Funes over those of Rodrigo Ávila. “El Barrio El Ángel es zona 
liberada” [The El Ángel neighborhood is a liberated zone], this neighbor declared proudly, 
using an expression employed by guerrillas during the war to denote FMLN strongholds. This 
confrontation over the color of the neighborhood was not an isolated incident in Santiago but 
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one that was occurring ever more frequently as the 2009 elections approached. Tensions 
escalated to the point of fights and gunfire, as recounted publicly by those involved on both 
sides. National media outlets reported similar incidents nationwide. This election-related 
violence was not unprecedented in Santiago; during the campaign of the 2004 presidential 
elections two ARENA loyalists had been run over and killed while plastering their party’s 
propaganda throughout the Coastal Road that crosses the municipio.ii 
In 2008 and 2009 I closely followed the elections in Santiago Nonualco. Observing 
the electoral strategies of the various parties often entailed travelling with their leaders and 
constituents to various sectors of Santiago as well as to neighboring municipios and San 
Salvador, thereby allowing me to draw comparisons among different municipios and regions. 
When I arrived in El Salvador on 1 August 2008, the electoral campaign for the municipal 
and legislative elections to be held on 18 January 2009 and the presidential elections on 15 
March had not yet officially commenced. Yet the main parties’ constituencies had already 
been campaigning for two years, their frantic activity and passion steadily gaining momentum 
as the elections approached. ARENA and FMLN constituents had been organizing support 
groups in urban and rural areas to secure votes and labor force for the coming elections. Their 
work, as described above, had often incurred tension and conflicts as members of both parties 
sought to dominate and win votes in neighborhoods and municipios whose residents lacked 
clearly defined political allegiances. Much of the tension stemmed from the fact that ARENA 
and FMLN represented the opposing sides of El Salvador’s civil war in the 1980s. This 
wartime parallel was evident in some of the incidents I witnessed during and after the 
electoral campaign. 
A few months before the presidential elections, Marta, the seventy-year-old woman 
who heads my host family, was chatting with a friend below a prominent poster of Mauricio 
Funes that she had strategically placed so that it could be sighted from the street. Pointing 
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the poster, her friend remarked in a low voice: “If Ávila wins the elections, you may regret 
this. You should be careful”. Rodrigo Ávila, one of El Salvador’s former police directors, was 
rumored to have participated in death squads during the war and many speculated on the 
repression he might unleash against FMLN supporters if ARENA won the election. Marta 
appeared to disregard her friend’s advice. However, in the intimacy of her home, she would 
repeatedly insist that we all—her son, daughters, and me as well—have our passports ready. 
“If this man [Rodrigo Ávila] wins the elections, there is going to be matazón [slaughter],” she 
would say. This was consistent with rumors exchanged among other FMLN loyalists about 
gunmen hired by ARENA to kill FMLN leaders during the elections. Indeed, many insisted 
that a significant number of the daily homicides in El Salvador were politically motivated. 
Meanwhile, rumors circulated among ARENA loyalists about the dire consequences 
of an FMLN regime. Immediately after the FMLN victory in the 2009 presidential elections, I 
learnt about rumors in various sectors of Santiago that several old women had literally fallen 
sick with worry over what the FMLN would do with those no longer able to work. ARENA 
members had disseminated rumors about how a communist regime would conduct a purge of 
the elders. A relative of my host family from a rural sector told of her neighbor’s eighty-year-
old mother, who remained bedridden and hysterical over what she feared the new government 
would do with her. Interestingly, so pervasive was the anxiety about the electoral outcome 
that I identified similar fears among FMLN supporters. At a post-election meeting of the local 
FMLN leadership, a man with a profitable business that imports vehicles from the United 
States, clearly distressed, asked one of the party’s regional deputies whether the FMLN would 
actually enact a socialist regime and intervene to take private property away from people. The 
deputy calmed him down explaining that no private property would be touched and that this 
FMLN government would only give impetus to the possibility of a future socialist state. 
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Both FMLN and ARENA loyalists thus participated in the affective dynamics at work 
during the 2009 elections, when fear became a popular currency of relations on both the left 
and right. Yet, in order to understand what underlies contemporary El Salvador’s political 
polarization in the context of the 2009 elections and the clientelist relationships that 
developed in its aftermath, an historical excursus is in order. FMLN and ARENA originated 
in the midst of the Cold War and were inspired by the Manichean discourse and political 
identities of that era. The FMLN was born in October 1980 out of the union of five political-
military organizations that had formed and developed in El Salvador throughout the 1970s in 
response to growing economic and political exclusion (Almeida 2008). Their militarization 
was also encouraged by the Cubans’ overthrowing of Batista’s regime in 1959 and later by 
the triumph of the Sandinista revolution at the close of the 1970s. The aim of uniting the 
disparate ;organizations into the FMLN was to defeat the Salvadoran government militarily 
and eventually enact a socialist regime. The FMLN embraced Marxism-Leninism, conceiving 
of the state as an elite instrument and democracy as a mere façade under which the country’s 
military and economic elites pursued their interests through the state (Martín Álvarez 2010: 
11). The option of reforming capitalism was rejected; FMLN leaders instead called for armed 
revolution as the path to socialism, with a vanguard of intellectuals playing a fundamental 
role in unleashing this revolution. In rural areas particularly, it was the influence of liberation 
theologyiii that led much of the population to join and support the armed struggle (Peterson 
1997). 
The founding of ARENA in 1981 stemmed from discontent among members of El 
Salvador’s landed elite with the agricultural reforms enacted by the governing Christian 
Democratic Party (PDC), which had followed the failed reformist-minded military junta 
formed after the 1979 coup. ARENA was founded as an anti-communist and conservative 
party. It supported harsh U.S.-funded counter-insurgency measures during the war, and the 
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party’s main leader, Major Roberto D’Aubuisson, was held responsible for the creation of 
death squads and the orchestration of political assassinations. Economically, ARENA 
embraced a neoliberal agenda that transferred wealth into finance, thereby facilitating a great 
degree of elite re-composition after the collapse of the agro-export model of accumulation 
(Segovia 2002). 
ARENA won its first presidential election in 1989. This victory, along with the control 
of El Salvador’s Legislative Assembly, allowed its members to enact an intense neoliberal 
agenda, which included the country’s gradual dollarization since 2001 and the deregulation 
and privatization of state-owned sectors, including public utilities. The widespread disfavor 
that greeted these measures notwithstanding, ARENA has amassed a significant number of 
votes from the country’s rural populations in ensuing post-war elections. The party’s success 
at the polls stemmed partly from the political clientelism it practiced in rural areas, 
specifically, the hiring of political allies and the distribution of goods among those who 
showed allegiance during electoral campaigns. While disaffection and abstention have 
predominated in the post-war elections, both ARENA and FMLN have managed to maintain 
core constituencies through, on the one hand, ideological affinity and wartime family 
experiences and, on the other, clientelism. Since the 2004 elections, the support ARENA has 
received from rural populations in regions like La Paz has also been rooted in the fears about 
the FMLN. As of 2004, ARENA’s mobilization of anti-communist discourse and symbols, 
along with the FMLN’s own dogmatism, fed anxiety about an FMLN victory in the 
presidential elections. Yet, despite ARENA’s support from rural populations, a popular view 
has remained—on both the right and the left—of the ARENA-ruled state as elitist and 
standing in opposition to the poor masses. This view of the state is partly rooted in the 
Marxist analyses popularized in the 1970s and 1980s by political and military organizations 
as well as popular movements led by progressive priests who espoused liberation theology. 
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These analyses have crystallized in the popular reference to the ARENA-ruled state as “the 14 
families,” which denotes the concentration of economic and political capital among a small 
elite. 
El Salvador’s 2004 and 2009 presidential elections, in short, marked a significant 
increase in the passion and fear experienced by party loyalists and opponents respectively. 
The strategies and passions associated with the 2009 electoral campaign amounted to a re-
enactment of the war that stirred wartime memories and unresolved tensions among 
significant segments of the Salvadoran population (Montoya 2013). Not only were these 
elections more disputed than prior ones, but they also managed to move a large portion of the 
Salvadoran population. Certainly, the politics of fear practiced by ARENA in 2009 and the 
unresolved wartime conflicts that this politics evoked played an important part in inciting 
passionate political participation. At least among core FMLN constituencies, a sentiment of 
aggrievement predominated, stemmed from the 20 years of consecutive ARENA governments 
that had ruled the country since the war. In the eyes of many FMLN supporters, these 
governments were the embodiment of wartime repression and the power of an elite that had 
historically accumulated wealth through labor-intensive agriculture. 
 Yet the FMLN did not win the elections simply by capitalizing on wartime grieves 
and anxieties and solidifying the support of its core constituencies, but by amassing the votes 
of Salvadorans disillusioned by the persistent inequality and daily homicides of the post-war 
era. It is necessary to underscore the tremendous sense of promise represented by the FMLN, 
which until 2009 had been unable to govern and hence to disappoint, and which for many 
represented the possibility of a radically different political project. FMLN presidential 
candidate Mauricio Funes played a crucial role in the party’s popularity. A charismatic left-
wing journalist and human rights advocate, Funes had had no prior attachment to the FMLN. 
In addition to representing a position independent of the FMLN, he addressed pressing social 
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and economic issues during the campaign. In a speech delivered during a visit to Santiago on 
10 March 2009, Funes stressed his commitment to, among other things, providing credit and 
assistance to those working the land as well as social housing and other subsidies for poor 
families. These were important concerns for largely rural municipios like Santiago. His 
candidacy thus embodied for many the possibility of significant change and, as I will show 
next, the opening up of opportunities for demanding redress for previous offences, whether 
rooted in the wartime or post-war eras. 
 
“It’s Our Turn Now” 
The day after the presidential elections, Mauricio Funes addressed a massive audience of 
FMLN loyalists celebrating their victory in San Salvador with the following declaration: 
“Ahora es el turno del ofendido, ahora es la oportunidad de los excluidos, ahora es la 
oportunidad de los marginados, ahora es la oportunidad de los auténticos demócratas” [Now 
it’s the turn of the offended, now it’s the opportunity of the excluded, now it’s the opportunity 
of the marginalized, now it’s the opportunity of the authentic democrats].iv His paraphrasing 
of Salvadoran poet Roque Dalton was consistent with the rhetoric of change that had typified 
the FMLN 2009 electoral campaign. During the campaign, Funes and the FMLN had 
criticized the deepening of economic and public insecurity that had occurred during the 
twenty years of ARENA rule. Rather than proclaiming a transition to socialism or the reversal 
of ARENA’s neoliberal agenda, Funes had proposed a greater inclusiveness. Funes and the 
FMLN had presented themselves as “el partido del pueblo” [the party of the people] in direct 
opposition to the elitist party ARENA. In this sense, Funes’s utterances the day after the 
elections emphasized that the FMLN victory was more than just the replacement of one party 
by another; its victory marked an opportunity for inclusion of those who had been excluded 
both historically and during the ARENA governments. 
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In the days and months that followed, I noted events, actions and conversations in 
Santiago suggesting that ordinary disaffected and left-wing people perceived the FMLN 
victory in much the same way that Funes had suggested in his telling speech, that is, as an 
opportunity for redress. Soon after the FMLN victory, my friend Elena, a middle-aged woman 
I had known since my first visit to Santiago in 2001, turned her celebratory mood into 
proactive efforts to shift control of the public hospital at which she worked from pro-ARENA 
doctors and administrators to those supportive of the FMLN. She and some of her colleagues 
at the Santa Teresa Hospital in Zacatecoluca, La Paz’s regional capital located a twenty-
minute drive away from Santiago, joined forces to appoint a new director. “You don’t know 
what the Areneros [ARENA members and loyalists] have done to the hospital”, she would say 
to me. “They have pilfered the hospital’s medicines and materials to cater to their own private 
clinics in San Salvador. Do you remember the case I mentioned to you of a poor seventy-
year-old woman who had surgery to receive a prosthesis implant? She bought the prosthesis, 
and the doctor who did the surgery implanted her with an old prosthesis that he had removed 
from another patient. Within a few days the woman stopped walking and ended up in San 
Salvador, in El Rosales [Hospital]. The relatives told me that at some point they had 
suspected some irregularity during the surgery, and I couldn’t help but tell them what I had 
learnt about the prosthesis replacement from the nurse who had assisted the doctor during the 
surgery. These Areneros have no shame about taking advantage of the very poorest!” she 
exclaimed acrimoniously. 
Complaints from Elena and her colleagues were also directed at the alleged corruption 
surrounding the reconstruction of the hospital, still unfinished in 2009. The building of the 
Santa Teresa Hospital had been severely damaged by two earthquakes that struck La Paz in 
2001. The building was abandoned thereafter, aside from a few administrative offices that 
remained on the ground floor. All patients, practice and surgery rooms, and machines, were 
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relocated in insalubrious portable cabins, where they remained in 2009. Although the 
ARENA government had received funding from the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IDB) to rebuild the hospital by 2009, the funds had been exhausted and the work halted by 
2008, before the building had been finished.v Given these circumstances, Elena and her 
colleagues saw the FMLN victory as an opportunity to subvert the Areneros’ political control 
of the hospital. In the months following the elections, they wrote petition letters to the Health 
Minister and met with various FMLN leaders they knew in La Paz, one of whom managed to 
arrange a meeting with the Minister. Elena and her colleagues saw the meeting as an 
opportunity to explain in person to the Minister why they wanted her to appoint a new 
hospital director and to hand over to her the hundreds of signatures they had collected in 
support of the appointment of one of their colleagues, an FMLN member, as hospital director. 
Weeks after the meeting, the Minister acceded to their request. 
Similar excitement characterized the expectations of many Santiagueños regarding the 
FMLN’s opportunity to capsize ARENA’s control and partisan management of Semilla 
Mejorada [Improved Seed]. A state-funded program launched in 2006 with the goal of 
alleviating the debts incurred by small-scale peasants, Semilla Mejorada had in practice 
operated as a local patronage project. ARENA party leaders, rather than state institutions, 
distributed agricultural consumables, thus employing the program to remunerate those rural 
dwellers who had actively supported the party and to court others in hopes of securing their 
votes. Santiago is a predominantly rural municipio, employing nearly half of its population in 
agriculture—the economic activity offering the lowest salary along with domestic labor. This 
being the case, the distribution of seeds and fertilizer effectively granted ARENA a large 
political clientele, while excluding political opponents from the program. 
In the months leading up to the presidential elections, I overheard many conversations 
about ARENA’s distribution of goods to those joining the party and attending its weekly 
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public meetings in Santiago on Sundays. I witnessed one of those famed Semilla Mejorada 
distributions. On my way to the municipio market, I saw one day that a crowd had gathered 
around the ARENA headquarters. Inside, I saw a large pile of two-pound bags of beans. An 
ARENA leader explained to me that the party was concerned about the welfare of the 
country’s rural populations and that Semilla Mejorada was ARENA’s program to assist the 
poorest citizens. Immediately thereafter, I heard another ARENA leader explain to a sixty-
year-old man wearing a typical peasant hat that only ARENA members would be receiving 
the beans. The ARENA leader suggested that this man join the party so as to become eligible 
for future distributions. Following his advice, the man joined a queue consisting mainly of 
middle-aged and elderly men wearing similar peasant-like garb. They were all signing up as 
ARENA members on the expectation to benefit from future distributions of agricultural 
consumables. 
While the partisan nature of this program had been widely criticized by FMLN 
supporters during the election, after the FMLN victory many of them began harboring the 
hope that it would now be their turn to benefit from Semilla Mejorada and other programs. To 
communicate their pressing needs, these disaffected and left-wing Santiagueños met with 
local FMLN leaders, invited FMLN deputies to their neighborhoods and communities, or 
visited ministers and other FMLN state officials in their offices, so as to make them aware of 
the public works most urgently needed in their communities or ask for more personal favours 
such as jobs.  
A different, though just as fervent, sort of hope was harbored by those who expected 
the FMLN government to redress wartime human rights violations. Several Santiagueños 
approached local FMLN leaders as well as one of the regional deputies after the elections to 
ask whether there was a way to find out what had happened to their relatives during the war—
whether they had disappeared or been killed and buried in one of the numerous unmarked 
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mass graves scattered throughout the country. Still intimidated by their memories of the death 
squads and paramilitary groups that operated with impunity in La Paz during the war, many 
residents of Santiago and neighboring municipios had made no attempt to learn the 
whereabouts of their disappeared during the twenty years of ARENA rule. The new FMLN 
government, they believed, provided a more appropriate milieu in which to ask these 
questions. 
Until then, post-war efforts to address the war and wartime human rights violations 
had been marginal and limited to the work of a few grassroots organizations and NGOs. The 
Father Cosme Spessotto Committee, which consists of relatives of wartime victims and 
victims themselves, is a grassroots organization performing memory work in La Paz since 
2005. During the elections, Committee members wrote letters outlining their requests to 
Mauricio Funes and several candidates for the legislative and municipal elections with whom 
they were familiar. They too celebrated the FMLN’s victory in the presidential elections as an 
opportunity to redress human rights violations and demand compensation, both moral and 
material. With that goal, they designed a program to compensate war victims and, through 
personal networks within the FMLN as well as NGOs, managed to meet several times to 
discuss their proposal with Vanda Piñato, Funes’s wife and the country’s Social Inclusion 
Secretary after the FMLN victory.  
Mauricio Funes’s victory speech, in sum, seems to have echoed a predominant post-
election feeling among ordinary people who had supported the FMLN during the electoral 
campaign. “It’s our turn now” was explicitly articulated by some and implied by others in 
their proactive engagements with state officials and FMLN party leaders after the elections. 
These engagements took a range of forms, from the goal of securing material benefits via the 
party to the search for redress for exclusion and wrongdoings during both the wartime and 
post-war eras. In this sense, Funes’s speech and explicit reference to “the turn of the offended” 
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captured a generalized feeling of exclusion and aggrievement. Ordinary people in Santiago 
were offended by the under-funded, ruinous and corrupted state of El Salvador’s public health 
care; offended by their own exclusion from state-funded programs and the absence of public 
utilities and public works in their communities; offended by the 1993 Amnesty Law passed 
by the ARENA governments that imposed silence regarding wartime human rights violations 
and precluded both retributive and restorative justice. The FMLN victory offered an 
opportunity for redress and thus for the envisioning of qualitative state transformation, which 
in turn inspired Salvadorans to attempt to reactivate their relationship to the state through 
personal networks. These attempts would turn out to be short-lived, as in many cases people 
soon realized their requests would not be fulfilled. 
 
Citizenship through the State 
As described above, after the 2009 elections I witnessed or heard about innumerable attempts 
by ordinary people in Santiago, as well as other municipios in La Paz, to meet with and make 
requests of newly appointed state officials. Channeled through letters, phone calls and visits, 
these initiatives were coeval yet uncoordinated; most had not been preceded by much 
organizational effort. Prior to the elections, Elena and her colleagues had not planned to shift 
ARENA’s control of the hospital where they worked. Likewise, it was only after the elections 
that those seeking to benefit from Semilla Mejorada and other state-funded programs from 
which they had been excluded made efforts to negotiate with FMLN leaders to insist on their 
inclusion in these programs or expound their requests. Such was also the case for those who 
suddenly decided to ask about relatives who had disappeared or were assassinated during the 
war in the 1980s. Although members of the Father Cosme Spessotto Committee had already 
written letters addressed to Funes and other FMLN members, it was the FMLN victory and 
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Funes’s declaration that it was now “the turn of the offended” that encouraged them to 
embark on the designing of a program of compensation for war victims.  
Interestingly, all these initiatives were channeled through the FMLN’s clientelist networks. 
Clientelism has historically been a salient trait of El Salvador’s routine politics. During 
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century elections—whether national or local—patron-client 
relations were very much in play in El Salvador (Ching 2014: 36–43). Rival patronage-based 
networks, linking members of the landed elite and peasants through clientelist and other 
bonds (familial, ethnic, and so on), served as the basis for arranging an electoral outcome 
prior to an election. It is important to note that peasants were not simply subordinated in this 
relationship of patronage; often they enjoyed a bargaining position. In contemporary El 
Salvador, elections work in much the same way—although networks are mobilized through 
more complex relationships, ideology playing a crucial role in maintaining core constituencies. 
During post-war elections, well-known members of both ARENA and FMLN (very often 
regional deputies) have acted as political bosses whom people approach to ask for favors. 
ARENA—being able to mobilize considerably more resources—has even temporarily hired 
local allies who are leaders in their communities, thereby being able to amass a significant 
number of votes. 
What is distinctive about post-war El Salvador, however, is that the web of 
relationships constituted by clientelism has among other things served as a means through 
which people circumvent state institutions and officials for reasons that have as much to do 
with fear and distrust of the state as with its presumed inefficiency (Montoya 2011: 189–195). 
Many ordinary Salvadorans regard both political and personal networks as safer, more 
trustworthy and more efficient channels than bureaucracies for dealing with pressing needs. 
Underreported cases of extortion and other crimes, as well as claims for jobs, housing and 
other basic needs not channeled through state institutions, are dealt with through 
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acquaintances with political connections or relatives who can penetrate the relevant state 
institutions. Yet, what I found notable about political clientelism in El Salvador after the 2009 
elections was its twofold functioning as a means through which people sought redress from 
previous state offences as well as a means through which they asserted an aspiration to a 
different relationship vis-à-vis the state. 
Letters, phone calls and visits—the means through which people in Santiago engaged 
with FMLN state officials following the elections—testified to their desire for a state that 
listens, cares and delivers. The ensuing face-to face encounters satisfied people’s aspiration to 
establish a more personalized relationship with the state. Lazar (2004) has suggested that 
enthusiastic embracement of political clientelism among the poor in the 1999 local elections 
in El Alto, Bolivia, served as a means to ‘substantiate citizenship’ by making democracy 
more personalized, accountable and representative.vi She finds that, in stark contrast to liberal 
definitions of citizenship and democracy as disengaged, delegative and based on rational 
decisions, clientelism allows ordinary people to directly engage politicians and effectively 
even to stand for election themselves, inasmuch as they benefit from their party’s victory by 
obtaining jobs in public office. While we could discuss whether increased substantive 
citizenship actually results from political clientelism in El Salvador, the FMLN victory 
inspired left-wing and disaffected people to envision a qualitative and more permanent 
transformation of the state itself—from the elitist state ruled by ARENA to one truly 
representing the Salvadoran people. 
The widespread practice of clientelism in post-war El Salvador suggests that the state 
is very much defined along party lines. Indeed, during the twenty years of ARENA rule, 
bureaucracies were saturated with ARENA loyalists to such a degree that once ARENA lost 
the presidential elections, ARENA deputies made sure a law was passed in the Legislative 
Assembly to hinder a massive replacement of public officials by the new FMLN 
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government.vii It is thus not surprising that a change of party could elicit the idea of deep 
transformation, of regime shift. The FMLN portrayed itself as “the party of the people” 
throughout the 2009 elections, evoking the FMLN’s roots in the country’s peasant population 
as well as in its aspiration to an alternative state project. It may have been this representation 
that led left-wing people to think that they could now visit the offices of high-profile state 
officials and even take the initiative to make suggestions to, and requests of, the state. I argue 
that Salvadorans’ political horizon—which opened with the Peace Accords in 1992 and later 
foreclosed in the face of increasing post-war disillusionment—opened up again with the 2009 
elections. Once again, as during the 1970s and 1980s, left-wing and disaffected Salvadorans 
embraced the possibility that the state might actually represent and work for the people. 
Specifically, the desires, aspirations and expectations that ordinary Salvadorans have 
invested in the idea of the state as a political subject and the central role that this idea plays in 
their political imaginaries may be related in part to the liberal traditions of Latin America and 
their coalescence throughout the twentieth century with emancipatory and socialist ideologies. 
As Baud (2007) has observed with regard to indigenous groups’ quest for citizenship in the 
Andean countries, throughout the twentieth century the republican tradition of these countries 
led increasingly to the nation-state’s becoming a legitimate interlocutor and hence the basis 
for definition and entitlement of citizenship rights and responsibilities. Meanwhile, the 
reverberations of liberation theology in El Salvador’s rural areas as well as the later 
dissemination of international human rights rhetoric—although perhaps of limited 
penetration—should not be underestimated in promoting the state as the primary entity on 
which the claims and demands of ordinary people regarding citizenship rights are placed. 
Even more important is the historical conjuncture afforded by the rise of the so-called New 
Left in Latin America, which has provided a regional context in which new state-citizenry 
pacts have been forged, including a ‘return of the state’ as the subject morally responsible for 
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delivering socioeconomic and political rights (Grugel and Riggirozzi 2012). Yet, as already 
illustrated, in El Salvador the channels through which post-election demands were placed on 
the new FMLN ruled-state were not state bureaucracies but the more personalized routes 
provided by clientelist practices. 
Overall, given their efforts to channel their post-election petitions through state 
officials—albeit through those that are part of clientelist networks—I suggest that 
Salvadorans think of themselves as citizens through the state. Gordon and Stack (2007: 120) 
have suggested that citizenship cannot be reduced to a relationship with the state and have 
exposed the historical contingency of the state-citizenship coupling. They contend that, given 
the state roll-back of the neoliberal era, it is more appropriate to think in terms of citizenship 
beyond the state. I argue, however, that even as clientelism—as a circumvention of state 
institutions—might affirm such a delineation, the aspiration of ordinary Salvadorans in a rural 
municipio to be received by state officials and to channel their requests through them is rather 




An examination of El Salvador’s 2009 elections has facilitated an understanding of how a 
particularly affective milieu might fuel hopes and in turn political action. El Salvador’s 2009 
presidential election and the victory of Mauricio Funes and the FMLN in this election elicited 
a political imaginary that had dissipated during the post-war era. ‘Democratic disenchantment’ 
(Moodie 2010: 145) had become a predominant sentiment due to the minimal economic 
reform stipulated in the Peace Accords and the gradual roll-back of the state—with the 
exception of its punitive and military functions and minimal poverty alleviation programs—
that consecutive ARENA governments had enacted as part of their neoliberal agenda. The 
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passionate involvement in party politics by people on both the left and right rekindled 
wartime conflicts as well as the hopes and fears thereof. Among left-wing Salvadorans, there 
was a renewed sense of possibility vis-à-vis the political project for which they had fought 
and lost relatives during the war. Partly due to Funes’s candidacy, the elections sparked 
hopeful feelings not just among the FMLN’s core constituencies but also among segments of 
the Salvadoran population disaffected by the ARENA governments yet initially dubious of 
the FMLN due to this party’s dogmatism during the post-war era. 
After the FMLN victory, passions continued to run high. During the first few months 
of FMLN government, both left-wing and disaffected Salvadorans suddenly made proactive 
efforts to activate FMLN clientelist networks that would enable face-to-face encounters with 
state officials. Opportunistic attempts to benefit from an FMLN government coalesced with a 
desire for redress—this understood as compensation for various forms of exclusions and 
offences, both historical and recent. All of this, channeled through clientelist networks 
involving state officials evidenced the central role of the state in ordinary people’s political 
imaginaries and aspirations. If a particular historical logic of accumulation explains why the 
state has remained a discrete entity in the minds of ordinary Salvadorans on both the left and 
right, the syncretic legacy of liberalism and emancipatory ideologies, along with a regional 
trend of refashioning state-citizenry relationships and forms of democratic participation, 
explain how it is that the notion of the state retains a central place in Salvadorans’ imaginaries. 
I have thus suggested that despite the disillusionment, distrust and fear of state institutions 
that I observed both before and after 2009, Salvadorans aspire to a political project in which 
the state plays an important part. It was after all the intensely passionate milieu of the 2009 






i Until then, only the 1994 elections—El Salvador’s first democratic elections—had surpassed 
a 50 percent turnout (Artiga-González 2004: 38). 
ii See ‘Un muerto durante cierre de campaña’, La Prensa Gráfica, 19 March 2004; ‘Entierran 
activista arenero’, La Prensa Gráfica, 20 March 2004. 
iii “Liberation theology” is the progressive Catholic doctrine with origins in the 1968 Latin 
American Conference of Catholic Bishops in Colombia, which in turn was influenced by the 
Second Vatican Council. This progressive hermeneutics, disseminated throughout much of 
Latin America during the 1970s by priests and laypeople, incorporated Marxist categories of 
analysis and a critique of capitalism (Planas 1986). 
iv ‘Funes: “llegó el turno del ofendido”’, Faro de Vigo, 16 March 2009. 
v ‘El terremoto que duró 10 años’: 
http://www.elfaro.net/templates/elfaro/especiales/hospital/nota01.php 
vi Although such a discussion is beyond the scope of this article, one could suggest to the 
contrary that clientelism is tantamount to charity insofar as it undermines the notion of 
citizens as equal rights-bearers (Boltvinik and Hernández cited in Gledhill 2005: 81). 




Almeida, Paul D. 2008. Waves of Protest: Popular Struggle in El Salvador, 1925–2005. 
Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press. 
 





Artiga-González, Álvaro. 2004. Elitismo competitivo. Dos décadas de elecciones en El 
Salvador (1982–2003). San Salvador: UCA Editores. 
 
Auyero, Javier. 2000. Poor People’s Politics: Peronist Survival Networks and the Legacy of 
Evita. Durham and London: Duke University Press. 
 
Banerjee, Mukulika. 2007. “Sacred Elections.” Economic and Political Weekly, 1556–1562. 
 
Baud, Michiel. 2007. “Indigenous Politics and the State: The Andean Highlands in the 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries.” Social Analysis 51, no. 2: 19–42.  
 
Ching, Erik. 2014. Authoritarian El Salvador: Politics and the Origins of the Military 
Regimes, 1880–1940. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press. 
 
Coles, Kimberley A. 2004. “Election Day: The Construction of Democracy through 
Technique.” Cultural Anthropology 19, no. 4: 551–580.  
 
Cruz, José M. 1998a. “¿Por qué no votan los salvadoreños?” ECA – Estudios 
Centroamericanos, no. 595–596: 449–472. 
 
____ coord. 1998b. La violencia en El Salvador en los años noventa. Magnitud, costos y 
factores posibilitadores. San Salvador: IUDOP. 
 
____ 2001. ¿Elecciones para qué? El impacto del ciclo electoral 1999–2000 en la cultura 





Dalton, Roque. 1962. El turno del ofendido. La Habana: Casa de las Américas. 
 
Gay, Robert. 1999. “The Broker and the Thief: A Parable (Reflections on Popular Politics in 
Brazil).” Luso-Brazilian Review 36, no. 1: 49–70.  
 
Gledhill, John. 2005. “Citizenship and the Social Geography of Deep Neo-liberalization.” 
Anthropologica 47, no. 1: 81–100.  
 
Gordon, Andrew, and Trevor Stack. 2007. “Citizenship Beyond the State: Thinking with 
Early Modern Citizenship in the Contemporary World.” Citizenship Studies 11, no. 2: 117–
133.  
 
Gould, Deborah B. 2009. Moving Politics: Emotion and ACT UP’s Fight against Aids. 
Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press. 
 
Grugel, Jean, and Pía Riggirozzi. 2012. “Post-Neoliberalism in Latin America: Rebuilding 
and Reclaiming the State after Crisis.” Development and Change 43, no. 1: 1–21.  
 
Lazar, Sian. 2004. “Personalist Politics, Clientelism and Citizenship: Local Elections in El 
Alto, Bolivia.” Bulletin of Latin American Research 23, no. 2: 228–243.  
 
Martín Álvarez, Alberto. 2010. From Revolutionary War to Democratic Revolution: The 






McDonald, James H. 1997. “A Fading Aztec Sun: The Mexican Opposition and the Politics 
of Everyday Fear in 1994.” Critique of Anthropology 17, 263–292.  
 
McLeod, James R. 1999. “The Sociodrama of Presidential Politics: Rhetoric, Ritual, and 
Power in the Era of Teledemocracy.” American Anthropologist 101, no. 2: 359–373.  
 
Montoya, Ainhoa. 2011. “‘Neither War nor Peace:’ Violence and Democracy in Post-War El 
Salvador.” PhD diss., University of Manchester. 
 
____ 2013. “The Violence of Cold War Polarities and the Fostering of Hope: The 2009 
Elections in Post-War El Salvador.” Pp. 49–63 in Central America in the New Millennium: 
Living Transition and Reimagining Democracy, ed. Jennifer L. Burrell and Ellen Moodie. 
New York: Berghahn Books. 
 
Moodie, Ellen. 2010. El Salvador in the Aftermath of Peace: Crime, Uncertainty and the 
Transition to Democracy. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
 
Murray, Kevin. 1997. El Salvador: Peace on Trial. Oxford: Oxfam UK and Ireland. 
 
Navaro-Yashin, Yael. 2012. The Make-Believe Space: Affective Geography in a Postwar 
Polity. Durham and London: Duke University Press. 
 
Peterson, Anna L. 1997. Martyrdom and the Politics of Religion: Progressive Catholicism in 





Planas, Ricardo. 1986. Liberation Theology: The Political Expression of Religion. Kansas 
City, MO: Sheed & Ward. 
 
Ramos, Carlos G. 2000. “Marginación, exclusión social y violencia.” Pp. 7–47 in Violencia 
en una sociedad en transición: Ensayos, ed. Carlos G. Ramos. San Salvador: PNUD. 
 
Segovia, Alexander. 2002. Transformación estructural y reforma económica en El  
Salvador. El funcionamiento económico de los noventa y sus efectos sobre el crecimiento, la 
pobreza y la distribución del ingreso. Guatemala: F&G Editores. 
 
Silber, Irina C. 2011. Everyday Revolutionaries: Gender, Violence, and Disillusionment in 
Postwar El Salvador. New Brunswick, NJ and London: Rutgers University Press. 
 
Verdery, Katherine. 1999. The Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and  
Postsocialist Change. New York: Columbia University Press. 	  
